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Strongly Secure Privacy Amplification Cannot Be
Obtained by Encoder of Slepian-Wolf Code∗
Shun WATANABE†a), Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO††b), Members,
and Tomohiko UYEMATSU††c), Senior Member
SUMMARY Privacy amplification is a technique to distill
a secret key from a random variable by a function so that the
distilled key and eavesdropper’s random variable are statistically
independent. There are three kinds of security criteria for the
key distilled by privacy amplification: the normalized divergence
criterion, which is also known as the weak security criterion, the
variational distance criterion, and the divergence criterion, which
is also known as the strong security criterion. As a technique to
distill a secret key, it is known that the encoder of a Slepian-Wolf
(the source coding with full side-information at the decoder) code
can be used as a function for privacy amplification if we employ
the weak security criterion. In this paper, we show that the
encoder of a Slepian-Wolf code cannot be used as a function for
privacy amplification if we employ the criteria other than the
weak one.
key words: privacy amplification, secret key agreement,
Slepian-Wolf coding, strong security, variational distance, weak
security
1. Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in the cryptography
is the key agreement in which the legitimate parties,
usually referred to as Alice and Bob, share a secret
key that is not known by the eavesdropper, usually re-
ferred to as Eve. The problems on the key agreement
in the information theory was initiated by Maurer [14],
and was also studied by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1]. In
their formulation, Alice, Bob, and Eve have correlated
random variables Xn, Y n, and Zn respectively. Then,
Alice and Bob generate a secret key from (Xn, Y n) by
using the public (authenticated) communication.
Typically, a key agreement protocol consists of two
procedures: information reconciliation [3], [4] and pri-
vacy amplification [2], [3]. The purpose of the infor-
mation reconciliation for Alice and Bob is to share an
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identical random variable (with high probability) by us-
ing the public communication. Privacy amplification is
a technique to distill a secret key from the shared ran-
dom variable by using a function so that Eve’s knowl-
edge and the secret key are statistically independent.
In order to focus on privacy amplification, we assume
that Alice and Bob initially share the random variables
Xn = Y n in the rest of this paper.
As for the security of the secret key distilled by
privacy amplification, there are three kinds of security
criteria: the normalized divergence criterion, which is
also known as the weak security criterion, the varia-
tional distance criterion, and the divergence criterion,
which is also known as the strong security criterion.
The normalized divergence criterion requires that the
key and Eve’s knowledge Zn is (almost) statistically in-
dependent in the sense that the divergence divided by
n (normalized divergence), or equivalently the mutual
information divided by n, is negligible. On the other
hand, the variational distance criterion and the diver-
gence criterion require that the key and Eve’s knowl-
edge is (almost) statistically independent in the sense
that the variational distance and the divergence are
negligible respectively.
Traditionally, the normalized divergence criterion
was employed in the study of the key agreement
(e.g. [1], [14]). However, as pointed out by Maurer [15]
and independently by Csisza´r [7], Eve might know a
large part of the key even if the key satisfies the nor-
malized divergence criterion. Therefore, we should use
the divergence criterion. Indeed, recent studies on the
key agreement employ the divergence criterion (e.g. [9],
[19]).
As one of techniques to distill a secret key, it is
known that the encoder of a Slepian-Wolf (the source
coding with full side-information at the decoder) code
[26] can be used as a function for privacy amplification.
For example, Ahlswede and Csisza´r used this technique
implicitly [1], and Muramatsu used this technique ex-
plicitly [18].
To describe the technique more precisely, let us
consider the Slepian-Wolf code system such that Xn
is the principal source and Zn is the side-information.
Then, the output of the encoder, which is regarded as
the key, satisfies the normalized divergence criterion if
the coding rate of the code is close to the compression
Copyright c© 2010 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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limit and the decoding error probability of the code is
negligible. However, it has not been clarified whether
this technique can be used for the divergence criterion.
In this paper, we show that above mentioned tech-
nique cannot be used for the divergence criterion. Ac-
tually, we show that the divergence grows infinitely in
the order of
√
n, which suggests that Eve might know
a large part of the key.
In order to show that the divergence grows in the
order of
√
n, the second order converse coding theorem
of the Slepian-Wolf code system (Theorem 4) plays an
important role. The second order source coding (with-
out side-information) was studied by several authors
[12], [13], [22], and Theorem 4 can be regarded as a gen-
eralization of Hayashi’s result [12] to the Slepian-Wolf
code system. During the process of the review, Nomura
and Matsushima published the result [21] concerning
the second order asymptotic of the Slepian-Wolf code
system (the source coding with full side-information at
the decoder)†.
The difference between this paper and [21] is sum-
marized as follows. Since the main purpose of this
paper is to show that Slepian-Wolf codes cannot be
used as strongly secure privacy amplification, we only
showed the converse coding theorem. On the other
hand, the main purpose of [21] is to show the second
order coding theorem of the Slepian-Wolf code system,
and they showed both the direct and converse parts.
Although the independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) source is exclusively treated in this paper, the
slightly wider class of sources, i.e., the sources such that
the conditional self-information has an asymptotic nor-
mality, is treated in [21]. It should be noted that the
approach in [21] is different from that in this paper and
is similar to the approach in [22].
Although the divergence criterion is the strongest
notion of security among the above mentioned three
criteria, some researchers (eg. [25]) deem that the vari-
ational distance criterion is appropriate notion of secu-
rity because it matches with the universally compos-
able security [5], which requires that the actual distri-
bution of the key and Eve’s knowledge is indistinguish-
able from the ideal distribution with which the key is
uniformly distributed and independent of Eve’s knowl-
edge. Therefore, it is worthwhile clarifying whether the
key obtained by the above mentioned technique satisfies
the variational distance criterion or not. In this paper,
we show that the key obtained by the technique does
not satisfy the variational distance criterion. Actually,
we show that the variational distance converges to one
(the maximum amount), which means that the actual
distribution and the ideal distribution are completely
distinguishable.
The results in this paper are also interesting from
†The case in which both sources are encoded was pub-
lished in [20].
the view point other than privacy amplification. The
above mentioned technique can be regarded as the
Slepian-Wolf version of the folklore theorem shown by
Han [11]. Recently, Hayashi [12] showed that the folk-
lore theorem does not hold if we employ the variational
distance criterion nor the divergence criterion instead
of the normalized divergence criterion. Our results can
be regarded as a generalization of Hayashi’s results for
the Slepian-Wolf code.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we review the basic notations, privacy ampli-
fication, and the above mentioned technique. In Section
3, we show our main results concerning the divergence
criterion and their proofs. In Section 4, we show our
main results concerning the variational distance crite-
rion and their proofs. In Section 5, we conclude the
paper.
Finally, it should be noted that the results on the
divergence criterion and the variational distance crite-
rion cannot be derived from each other, though a weak
version of the result on the divergence criterion, i.e.,
the fact that the divergence does not converge to zero
(Corollary 13), can be derived as a corollary of the re-
sults on the variational distance criterion. The weak
version only suggests that Eve might know a few bits
about the key whose length grows infinitely as n goes
to infinity, which is not a serious problem in practice.
On the other hand, the result in Section 3 suggests that
Eve’s knowledge about the key also grows infinitely as
the length of the key goes to infinity, which is a seri-
ous problem in practice. Therefore, we need to treat
both the divergence criterion and the variational dis-
tance criterion separately.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Privacy Amplification
In this section, we review the basic notations related to
privacy amplification. Suppose that Alice and Bob have
a random variable Xn on Xn, and Eve has a random
variable Zn on Zn, where (Xn, Zn) are independently
identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to the proba-
bility distribution PXZ . In this paper, we assume that
X and Z are finite sets.
Privacy amplification [2], [3] is a technique to distill
a secret key Sn from X
n by using a function
fn : Xn →Mn = {1, . . . ,Mn}
so that the key and Eve’s information Zn are statisti-
cally independent and the key is uniformly distributed
on the key alphabet Mn. The joint probability distri-
bution of the key and Eve’s information is given by
PSnZn(s, z
n) =
∑
xn∈f−1n (s)
PXnZn(x
n, zn) (1)
for (s, zn) ∈ Mn × Zn, where we defined f−1n (s) =
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{xn : fn(xn) = s}.
For probability distributions P and Q on A, let
d(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
a∈A
|P (a)−Q(a)| (2)
= P (B)−Q(B) (3)
be the variational distance (divided by 2) [6], where
B ⊂ A is a set satisfying P (a) ≥ Q(a) for a ∈ B and
P (a) ≤ Q(a) for a ∈ A\B. Let
D(P‖Q) =
∑
a∈A
P (a) log
P (a)
Q(a)
be the divergence [6], where we take the base of the log-
arithm to be e throughout the paper. By using these
two quantities, we introduce three kinds of security cri-
teria on privacy amplification.
Definition 1 If a sequence of functions {fn} satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(fn) = 0 (4)
for
D(fn) = D(PSnZn‖PUn × PZn),
then we define privacy amplification by {fn} to be se-
cure with respect to the normalized divergence crite-
rion, where PUn is the uniform distribution on Mn.

Definition 2 If a sequence of functions {fn} satisfies
lim
n→∞
∆(fn) = 0 (5)
for
∆(fn) = d(PSnZn , PU × PZn),
then we define privacy amplification by {fn} to be se-
cure with respect to the variational distance criterion.

Definition 3 If a sequence of functions {fn} satisfies
lim
n→∞
D(fn) = 0, (6)
then we define privacy amplification by {fn} to be se-
cure with respect to the divergence criterion. 
We can show that Eq. (6) implies Eq. (5) by using
Pinsker’s inequality [6]. We can also show that Eq. (5)
implies Eq. (4) by using [9, Lemma 1].
The security criteria in Definitions 1 and 3 are
equivalent to the weak security criterion and the strong
security criterion defined in [16]. The security criterion
in Definition 2 is widely used recently (eg. [25]) because
it matches with the universally composable security [5],
which requires that the actual distribution PSnZn and
the ideal distribution PUn × PZn are indistinguishable.
Although the divergence is also related to the distin-
guishability between distributions, the variational dis-
tance is directly related to the distinguishability be-
cause the optimized average probability of the correct
discrimination is given by
1
2
max
A⊂Mn×Zn
[PSnZn(A) + PUnZn(Ac)]
=
1
2
[1 + d(PSnZn , PUn × PZn)], (7)
which is a straightforward consequence of the definition
of the variational distance [6], where the superscript c
designate the complement of the set.
2.2 Privacy Amplification by an Encoder of Slepian-
Wolf Code
In this section, we explain the Slepian-Wolf code, and
then review the relation between privacy amplification
and the Slepian-Wolf code. We consider the Slepian-
Wolf code system in which Xn is the principal source
and Zn is the side-information. The code system con-
sists of the encoder
φn : Xn →Mn
and the decoder
ψn :Mn ×Zn → Xn,
and we denote the code as Φn = (φn, ψn). The error
probability of the code is defined as
ε(Φn) = PXnZn({(xn, zn) : ψn(φn(xn), zn) 6= xn}).
For any real number R > 0, the rate R is said to
be achievable if there exists a sequence of codes {Φn}
that satisfies
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≤ R and lim
n→∞
ε(Φn) = 0. (8)
Then, we define the compression limit as
Rf (X |Z) = inf{R : R is achievable}.
It is well known that the compression limit coincides
with the conditional entropy [26], i.e., Rf (X |Z) =
H(X |Z).
If a sequence of codes {Φn} satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
logMn = H(X |Z) (9)
and
lim
n→∞
ε(Φn) = 0, (10)
then we call the sequence of codes {Φn} compression
limit achieving codes. When {Φn} satisfies Eq. (9), it
should be noted that the error probability depends on
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the second order rate 1√
n
log Mn
enH(X|Z) . For later use,
we present the converse coding theorem concerning the
tradeoff between the error probability and the second
order rate. The theorem is a Slepian-Wolf coding ver-
sion of the result on the second order asymptotic of the
source coding [12].
Theorem 4 Let b ∈ R be an arbitrary real number.
For any code sequence {Φn}, if the error probability
satisfies
lim sup
n→∞
ε(Φn) < 1−G
(
b
σ
)
, (11)
then the rate satisfies
lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
log
Mn
enH(X|Z)
≥ b, (12)
where
G(t) =
∫ t
−∞
1√
2pi
e−u
2/2du
is the cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and where we
set
σ2 = Var
[
log
1
PX|Z(X |Z)
]
. (13)

This theorem is a straight forward consequence of
the central limit theorem, and we show a proof in Ap-
pendix A.
In order to show the relation between privacy am-
plification and the Slepian-Wolf code, we consider the
situation in which Alice and Bob share the princi-
pal source Xn and Eve has the side-information Zn.
Then, Alice and Bob use the encoder φn as a func-
tion for privacy amplification, and we regard the out-
put Sn = φn(X
n) of the encoder as a secret key. The
following proposition states that the encoders of com-
pression limit achieving codes can be used as functions
for privacy amplification if we employ the normalized
divergence criterion.
Proposition 5 If a sequence of codes {Φn = (φn, ψn)}
satisfies Eqs. (9) and (10), then we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(φn) = 0.

This proposition can be proved almost in a similar
manner to [18, Theorem 1]. The proposition can be
also dirived as a special case of Eq. (18) in Remark 7.
Note that Proposition 5 can be regarded as the Slepian-
Wolf version of the folklore theorem [11] (see also [10,
Theorem 2.6.4]).
3. Divergence Criterion
3.1 Statement of Result
In this section, we show our main result concerning the
divergence criterion, which is proved in Section 3.2. In
Section 2.2, we showed that the encoders of compres-
sion limit achieving codes can be used as functions for
secure privacy amplification in the sense of the normal-
ized divergence criterion. The following theorem states
that the divergence actually grows infinitely in the or-
der of
√
n (Eq. (16)), which suggests that Eve might
know a large part of the key.
Theorem 6 Suppose that a sequence of functions, fn :
Xn → {1, . . . ,Mn} for n = 1, 2, . . ., satisfies Eq. (9),
and let
b = lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
log
Mn
enH(X|Z)
.
Then, we have
lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
D(fn) ≥
∫ b
σ
−∞
(b− σu)g(u)du, (14)
where
g(u) =
1√
2pi
e−u
2/2
is the density function of the Gaussian distribution with
mean 0 and variance 1, and where σ2 is the variance
defined in Eq. (13). 
The theorem can be regarded as a generalization
of [12, Theorem 8] for the Slepian-Wolf code.
Suppose that the Slepian-Wolf code sequence
{Φn = (φn, ψn)} satisfies Eq. (9) and
lim sup
n→∞
ε(Φn) < 1. (15)
Then, there exists a real number b ∈ R such that
lim sup
n→∞
ε(Φn) < 1−G
(
b
σ
)
.
Since the right hand side of Eq. (14) is an increasing
function of b and is positive for any b ∈ R, Theorem
4 and Theorem 6 imply that there exists a constant
K > 0 and an integer n0 such that
D(φn) ≥
√
nK (16)
for every n ≥ n0.
Remark 7 When the Slepian-Wolf code sequence sat-
isfies Eq. (9), i.e., the first order rate is equal to
the compression limit, and also satisfies Eq. (15), we
showed above that the divergence divided by
√
n is
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lower bounded by a constant asymptotically, i.e., the
divergence grows infinitely in the order of
√
n. On
the other hand, when the first order rate is strictly
larger than the compression limit, we can show that the
normalized divergence is lower bounded by a constant
asymptotically (Eq. (17)), i.e., the divergence grows in-
finitely in the order of n. Furthermore, for a given
first order rate, we can show that the lower bound on
the normalized divergence can be achieved by using en-
coders of Slepian-Wolf codes (Eq. (18)). It should be
noted that Proposition 5 can be derived as a special
case of Eq. (18). Eqs (17) and (18) are proved in Ap-
pendix B.4.
Let fn : Xn → {1, . . . ,Mn} for n = 1, 2, . . ., be
a sequence of functions (not necessarily encoders of
Slepian-Wolf codes) that satisfies
R = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn > H(X |Z).
Then, the inequality
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
D(fn) ≥ R−H(X |Z) (17)
implies that the divergence grows infinitely in the order
of n.
Let {Φn = (φn, ψn)} be a sequence of Slepian-Wolf
codes satisfying Eq. (8). Then, we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
D(φn) ≤ R−H(X |Z). (18)
Eqs. (17) and (18) clarify the optimal trade-off be-
tween the (first order) rate of the secret key and the
normalized divergence. Eq. (18) also states that the op-
timal trade-off can be achieved by encoders of Slepian-
Wolf codes. Evaluation of the trade-off between the so-
called equivocation rate, which is essentially equivalent
to the normalized divergence, and the rate of trans-
mitted message was well studied in the context of the
wire-tap channel in the literatures (e.g. [8], [27]). 
3.2 Proof of Theorem 6
In order to show a proof of Theorem 6, we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 8 Let
Tn =
{
(xn, zn) :
1
σ
√
n
(
log
1
PXn|Zn(xn|zn)
− nH(X |Z)
)
≤ b
σ
}
.
Then, we have
H(Sn|Zn)
≤
∑
(xn,zn)∈Tn
PXnZn(x
n, zn) log
1
PXn|Zn(xn|zn)
+PXnZn(T cn )[logMn − logPXnZn(T cn )].

Proof. Let
M′n =Mn ∪ Xn,
and let f ′n : Xn×Zn →M′n be the function defined by
f ′n(x
n, zn) =
{
fn(x
n) if (xn, zn) /∈ Tn
xn if (xn, zn) ∈ Tn .
We set the random variable S′n = f
′
n(X
n, Zn). Then,
we have
H(S′n|Zn)
=
∑
(xn,zn)∈Tn
PXnZn(x
n, zn) log
1
PXn|Zn(xn|zn)
+
∑
(s,zn)∈Mn×Zn
PS′
n
Zn(s, z
n) log
1
PS′
n
|Zn(s|zn)
.
(19)
By using the log-sum inequality [6], we can upper
bound the last term in Eq. (19) as
∑
(s,zn)∈Mn×Zn
PS′
n
Zn(s, z
n) log
PZn(z
n)
PS′
n
Zn(s, zn)
≤ PXnZn(T cn )[logMn − logPXnZn(T cn )]. (20)
Let f ′′n :M′n →Mn be the function defined by
f ′′n (s) =
{
s if s ∈Mn
fn(s) if s ∈ Xn .
Then, we have Sn = f
′′
n (S
′
n). Since the conditional en-
tropy does not increase by a function [6], by combining
Eqs. (19) and (20), we have the assertion of the lemma.

Proof of Theorem 6
By using Lemma 8, we have
1√
n
D(fn)
=
1√
n
[logMn −H(Sn|Zn)]
≥ 1√
n
[
logMn
−
∑
(xn,zn)∈Tn
PXnZn(x
n, zn) log
1
PXn|Zn(xn|zn)
− PXnZn(T cn ){logMn − logPXnZn(T cn )}
]
= PXnZn(Tn) 1√
n
log
Mn
enH(X|Z)
−σ
∑
(xn,zn)∈Tn
PXnZn(x
n, zn)
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1
σ
√
n
(
log
1
PXn|Zn(xn|zn)
− nH(X |Z)
)
+
1√
n
PXnZn(T cn ) logPXnZn(T cn ).
By taking the limit of both sides and using the central
limit theorem with respect to the cumulative distribu-
tion function
Pr
{
1
σ
√
n
(
log
1
PXn|Zn(Xn|Zn)
− nH(X |Z)
)
≤ u
}
,
we have
lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
D(fn)
≥ bG
(
b
σ
)
− σ
∫ b
σ
−∞
ug(u)du
=
∫ b
σ
−∞
(b− σu)g(u)du,
which completes the proof 
4. Variational Distance Criterion
4.1 Statement of Results
In this section, we show our main results concerning
the variational distance criterion, which are proved in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. First, we define the quantity
δ(PXnZn) as follows.
Definition 9 Let 1 ≤ Mn ≤ |X |n be an integer, and
Cn = {Czn}zn∈Zn be a family of sets such that each
Czn ⊂ Xn satisfies |Czn | = Mn, where |A| means the
cardinality of a set A. We define the distribution PCn
on Xn ×Zn as
PCn(x
n, zn) =
{
1
Mn
PZn(z
n) if xn ∈ Czn
0 else
.
Then, we define
δ(PXnZn) = minCn
d(PXnZn , PCn), (21)
where the minimization is taken over all possible choices
of Cn for arbitrary 1 ≤Mn ≤ |X |n. 
In Section 2.2, we showed that the encoders of com-
pression limit achieving codes can be used as functions
for secure privacy amplification in the sense of the nor-
malized divergence criterion. However, the following
Theorem 10 shows a trade-off (with some exceptions)
between the error probability ε(Φn) and the security
parameter ∆(φn) for any code Φn.
Theorem 10 For arbitrary Slepian-Wolf code Φn =
(φn, ψn), we have
ε(Φn) + ∆(φn) ≥ δ(PXnZn).

Theorem 11 If the variance σ2 defined in Eq. (13) is
positive, then we have
lim
n→∞
δ(PXnZn) = 1. (22)

The combination of Theorems 10 and 11 states
that we cannot use the encoders of any (good) Slepian-
Wolf codes as functions for secure privacy amplification
if we employ the variational distance criterion.
Corollary 12 For arbitrary Slepian-Wolf code Φn =
(φn, ψn), if
lim
n→∞ ε(Φn) = 0,
then we have
lim
n→∞
∆(φn) = 1
provided that σ2 > 0. 
From Eq. (7), Corollary 12 means that the actual
distribution PSnZn and the ideal distribution PUn×PZn
are completely distinguishable asymptotically.
The combination of Pinsker’s inequality and Corol-
lary 12 implies the following corollary, which states
that the keys obtained by the encoders of any (good)
Slepian-Wolf codes do not satisfy the divergence crite-
rion, although we have shown stronger result (Theorem
6) in Section 3.
Corollary 13 For any sequence of Slepian-Wolf codes
{Φn = (φn, ψn)} such that limn→∞ ε(Φn) = 0, we have
lim inf
n→∞ D(φn) ≥
2
ln 2
provided that σ2 > 0. 
The corollary only suggests that Eve might know a
few bits about the long key, which is not a serious prob-
lem in practice. On the other hand, the stronger result
suggests that Eve’s knowledge about the key grows in-
finitely as the length of the key goes to infinity, which
is a serious problem in practice.
Theorems 10 and 11 can be regarded as a gener-
alization of [12, Theorem 4] for the Slepian-Wolf code.
Therefore, Theorems 10 and 11 can also interpreted as
that the Slepian-Wolf version of the folklore theorem
does not hold for the variational distance criterion.
Remark 14 For a distribution PXZ with σ = 0, we
can easily show that δ(PXnZn) = 0 for any n by taking
Czn as the support of PXn|Zn(xn|zn). 
Remark 15 It should be noted that Theorem 10 holds
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not only for i.i.d. random variables (Xn, Zn), but also
for any (Xn, Zn). 
4.2 Proof of Theorem 10
Before we show a proof of Theorem 10, we introduce
the following lemma.
Lemma 16 For arbitrary code Φn = (φn, ψn), there
exists a code Φ′n = (φn, ψ
′
n) that satisfies
ε(Φ′n) ≤ ε(Φn) (23)
and
φn(ψ
′
n(s, z
n)) = s ∀(s, zn) ∈ Mn ×Zn. (24)

Proof. We construct a decoder ψ′n as follows. If
φn(ψn(s, z
n)) 6= s, then we set ψ′n(s, zn) = x˜n for
arbitrarily chosen x˜n ∈ φ−1n (s). Otherwise, we set
ψ′n(s, z
n) = ψn(s, z
n). From the construction of this
decoder, it is obvious that the code Φ′n = (φn, ψ
′
n) sat-
isfies Eqs. (23) and (24). 
Proof of Theorem 10
From Lemma 16, it suffices to prove Theorem 10
for codes satisfying Eq. (24). Therefore, we assume that
a code Φn satisfies Eq. (24) in the rest of this section.
By using the decoder ψn, we construct the map
ψn(s, z
n) = (ψn(s, z
n), zn). (25)
Since the decoder satisfies the condition in Eq. (24), ψn
is an injection map from Mn ×Zn into Xn ×Zn.
For the extended code Φn = (φn, ψn), we define
the error probability
ε(Φn)
= PXnZn({(xn, zn) : ψn(φn(xn), zn) 6= (xn, zn)}).
Obviously, we have ε(Φn) = ε(Φn).
Next, we define the distribution PUn × PZn , which
is the embedding of PUn×PZn into Xn×Zn, as follows:
PUn × PZn(xn, zn) = PUn × PZn(ψ
−1
n (x
n, zn))
for (xn, zn) ∈ ψn(Mn×Zn), and PUn × PZn(xn, zn) =
0 for other (xn, zn). Similarly, we define the distri-
bution PSnZn , which is the embedding of PSnZn into
Xn ×Zn.
Since the decoder ψn satisfies Eq. (24), we have
PXnZn(x
n, zn) ≤
∑
x˜n∈φ−1n (φn(xn))
PXnZn(x˜
n, zn)
= PSnZn(x
n, zn) (26)
for (xn, zn) ∈ ψn(Mn × Zn), where the equality in
Eq. (26) follows from Eq. (1) and the definition of
PSnZn . On the other hand, we have
PXnZn(x
n, zn) ≥ PSnZn(xn, zn) = 0 (27)
for (xn, zn) ∈ (Xn × Zn)\ψn(Mn × Zn). Noting
Eqs. (26) and (27) and using Eq. (3), we have
d(PXnZn , PSnZn)
= PXnZn((Xn ×Zn)\ψn(Mn ×Zn)). (28)
By using Eq. (28), we can rewrite ε(Φn) as
ε(Φn) = PXnZn((Xn ×Zn)\ψn(Mn ×Zn))
= d(PXnZn , PSnZn).
Finally, from the definition of δ(PXnZn) and the
triangular inequality, we have
δ(PXnZn) ≤ d(PXnZn , PUn × PZn)
≤ d(PXnZn , PSnZn)
+d(PSnZn , PUn × PZn)
= ε(Φn) + ∆(φn),
which completes the proof of Theorem 10. 
4.3 Proof of Theorem 11
Let {Cn} be the sequence of the families such that
d(PXnZn , PCn) = δ(PXnZn) for each n. For arbitrary
positive constant b > 0, we divide Xn × Zn into the
following three subsets:
A+ = {(xn, zn) : M−1n eb
√
n < PXn|Zn(x
n|zn)},
A− = {(xn, zn) : PXn|Zn(xn|zn) ≤M−1n e−b
√
n},
and A0 = (Xn ×Zn)\(A+ ∪ A−). Let
Cn =
⋃
zn∈Zn
{(xn, zn) : xn ∈ Czn},
which is the support of PCn .
We bound δ(PXnZn) as follows:
δ(PXnZn)
=
1
2

 ∑
(xn,zn)∈A+
|PXnZn(xn, zn)− PCn(xn, zn)|
+
∑
(xn,zn)∈A−∩Cn
|PXnZn(xn, zn)− PCn(xn, zn)|
+
∑
(xn,zn)∈A−\Cn
|PXnZn(xn, zn)− PCn(xn, zn)|
+
∑
(xn,zn)∈A0
|PXnZn(xn, zn)− PCn(xn, zn)|


≥ 1
2
[(PXnZn(A+)− PCn(A+))
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+(PCn(A−)− PXnZn(A− ∩ Cn))
+PXnZn(A−\Cn)
+(PCn(A0)− PXnZn(A0))]
= 1− (PCn(A+) + PXnZn(A− ∩ Cn)
+PXnZn(A0)),
where, at the inequality, we used the relation∑
a∈B
|P (a)−Q(a)|
≥ max[P (B)−Q(B), Q(B)− P (B)]
for any distributions P and Q on A ⊃ B, and we
also used the facts PCn(A− ∩ Cn) = PCn(A−) and
PCn(A−\Cn) = 0.
We use the following inequalities
PCn(A+) ≤ e−b
√
n, (29)
PXnZn(A− ∩ Cn) ≤ e−b
√
n, (30)
and
PXnZn(A0) ≤ 2b√
2piσ
+
2C1√
n
( ρ
σ
)3
, (31)
where C1 is a constant that does not depend on n and
ρ is the third moment of − logPX|Z(X |Z). We will
prove these inequalities in Appendices B.1, B.2, and
B.3 respectively.
From Eqs. (29)–(31) and the fact that b > 0 is
arbitrary, we have
lim inf
n→∞ δ(PX
nZn)
≥ 1− lim sup
b→0
lim sup
n→∞
[PCn(A+) +
PXnZn(A− ∩ Cn) + PXnZn(A0)]
= 1.
Since the variational distance (divided by 2) is smaller
than 1, we have the statement of theorem. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the encoders of (good)
Slepian-Wolf codes cannot be used as functions for se-
cure privacy amplification in the sense of the varia-
tional distance criterion nor the divergence criterion.
The consequence of our results is that we must use pri-
vacy amplification not based on the Slepian-Wolf code
(e.g. [2], [9], [16], [24]) if we want to employ the crite-
ria other than the weak one (the normalized divergence
criterion).
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 4
In order to show a proof of Theorem 4, we need the
following lemma [17] (see also [10]).
Lemma 17 For any Slepian-Wolf code Φn = (φn, ψn),
we have
ε(Φn)
≥ PXnZn
({
(xn, zn) :
log
1
PXn|Zn(xn|zn)
≥ αn
})
−Mne−αn ,
where αn is arbitrary real number. 
For arbitrarily fixed γ > 0, suppose that there ex-
ists a code sequence {Φn} that satisfies Eq. (11) and
lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
log
Mn
enH(X|Z)
≤ b− 2γ.
Then, there exists a increasing sequence {ni}∞i=1 such
that
1√
ni
log
Mni
eniH(X|Z)
≤ b− γ
for every i.
By using Lemma 17 for αni =
√
nib + niH(X |Z),
we have
ε(Φni)
≥ PXniZni
({
(xni , zni) :
1
σ
√
ni
(
log
1
PXni |Zni (xni |zni)
− niH(X |Z)
)
≥ b
σ
})
− e−γ
√
ni
for every i. By using the central limit theorem, we have
lim sup
n→∞
ε(Φn) ≥ lim sup
i→∞
ε(Φni)
≥ 1−G
(
b
σ
)
,
which contradicts Eq. (11). Therefore, if the code se-
quence {Φn} satisfies Eq. (11), then it satisfies
lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
log
Mn
enH(X|Z)
> b− 2γ.
Since γ > 0 is arbitrary, we have the assertion of the
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theorem. 
Appendix B
B.1 Proof of Eq. (29)
From the definitions of PCn and A+, we have
PCn(A+) ≤
∑
(xn,zn)∈A+
1
Mn
PZn(z
n)
≤
∑
(xn,zn)∈A+
PXnZn(x
n, zn)e−b
√
n
≤ e−b
√
n.
B.2 Proof of Eq. (30)
From the definitions of PCn and A−, we have
PXnZn(A− ∩ Cn)
=
∑
(xn,zn)∈A−∩Cn
PXnZn(x
n, zn)
≤
∑
(xn,zn)∈A−∩Cn
1
Mn
PZn(z
n)e−b
√
n
=
∑
(xn,zn)∈A−∩Cn
PCn(x
n, zn)e−b
√
n
≤ e−b
√
n.
B.3 Proof of Eq. (31)
To simplify the notation, we introduce the random vari-
able
Wn =
n∑
i=1
log
1
PX|Z(Xi|Zi)
for (Xn, Zn) = ((X1, Z1), . . . , (Xn, Zn)). Then, we can
rewrite the left hand side of Eq. (31) as
PXnZn(A0)
= Pr{logMn − b
√
n ≤Wn < logMn + b
√
n}
= Pr
{
logMn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
− b
σ
≤ Wn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
<
logMn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
+
b
σ
}
= Pr
{
Wn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
<
logMn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
+
b
σ
}
− Pr
{
Wn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
<
logMn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
− b
σ
}
.
By using the central limit theorem [23, Corollary
6], we have
Pr
{
Wn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
<
logMn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
+
b
σ
}
≤
∫ logMn−nH(X|Z)
σ
√
n
+ b
σ
−∞
g(u)du+
C1√
n
( ρ
σ
)3
and
Pr
{
Wn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
<
logMn − nH(X |Z)
σ
√
n
− b
σ
}
≥
∫ logMn−nH(X|Z)
σ
√
n
− b
σ
−∞
g(u)du− C1√
n
( ρ
σ
)3
.
Hence, we have
PXnZn(A0) ≤
∫ logMn−nH(X|Z)
σ
√
n
+ b
σ
logMn−nH(X|Z)
σ
√
n
− b
σ
g(u)du+
2C1√
n
( ρ
σ
)3
.
Since the interval of the integral is 2bσ and the height of
g(u) is lower than 1, we have Eq. (31).
B.4 Proofs of Eqs. (17) and (18)
Eq. (17) is derived by the inequality
D(fn) = logMn −H(Sn|Zn)
≥ logMn −H(Xn|Zn)
= logMn − nH(X |Z).
On the other hand, Eq. (18) is derived by the inequality
D(φn) = logMn −H(Xn|Zn)
+[H(Xn|Zn)−H(Sn|Zn)]
= logMn − nH(X |Z) +H(Xn|Sn, Zn) (A· 1)
≤ logMn − nH(X |Z)
+nε(Φn) log |X |+ h(ε(Φn)), (A· 2)
where we used the fact that Sn is a function of X
n in
Eq. (A· 1), we used Fano’s inequality [6] in Eq. (A· 2),
and h(·) is the binary entropy function [6].
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